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Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,
443 U.S. 256, 99 S. Ct. 2753, 61 L. Ed. 2d 521 (1979).
The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique' marks another episode in the long Supreme Court - Congres-
sional struggle over the bases and division of liability for injuries to
longshoremen employed by stevedores and hired by shipowners! In Edmonds,
1. Edmonds was a five to three decision; Justice Powell did not vote.
2. In 1927 Congress enacted the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compen-
sation Act, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251 (amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970),
(codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C. (1976)), to provide a compensation scheme
between longshoremen or harbor workers and their employers. The Act provided for
strict liability but limited the benefits which could be received for work-related in-
juries. A long line of decisions which followed served to undermine the Act's purpose,
thus necessitating the 1972 amendments. In Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85,
95-99 (1946), the Court applied the warranty of seaworthiness previously reserved for
seamen to longshoremen. The doctrine of seaworthiness, created by the Court in The
Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903), provided for the absolute liability of shipowners for
seamen's injuries. See generally G. GILMORE AND C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY
§§ 1-10, 6-2, 6-38 (2d ed. 1975); Cohen and Dougherty, The 1972 Amendments to the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act: An Opportunity for Equitable
Uniformity in Tripartite Industrial Accident Litigation, 19 N.Y.L.F. 587-89 (1974). The
Sieracki Court extended the warranty of seaworthiness to longshoremen, thus permit-
ting the longshoreman to recover both from his employer, pursuant to the Act, and
from the shipowner under the doctrine of seaworthiness. The Court reasoned that the
(340)
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the Court reaffirmed the judicially-created admiralty rule that the shipowner
can be ordered to pay all damages not due to the longshoreman's own
negligence. Significantly, the Court found that Congress in enacting the 1972
amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act 3, [hereinafter referred to as the Act] did not intend to impose a
proportionate fault rule. The amendments eliminated the circuitous route by
which shipowners had circumvented the stevedore-employers' limited liabil-
ity under the Act.' As a result, where a longshoreman's injury is caused by
liability arose from the performance of the ship's services, and because longshoremen
performed the same type of services as the ship's crew, they should have the same
rights against the shipowner. See G. GILMORE AND C. BLACK, supra at §§ 6-21, 6-31,
6-41, 6-53, 6-58; Cohen and Dougherty, supra at 589.
In the years following Sieracki, shipowners sought contribution or indemnifi-
cation from land-based employers. By 1953, however, the Court established that the
employers were protected by the 1927 Act from any action for contribution. Pope &
Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953) (independent contractor engaged in carpentry
work aboard vessel; contractor-employer held not liable for contribution to shipowner);
Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 406 (1953) (indepen-
dent contractor performing repairs aboard vessel; contractor-employer held not liable
for contribution to shipowner). See also G. GILMORE AND C. BLACK, supra at §§ 6-14,
6-27a, 6-55, 6-61; Cohen and Dougherty, supra at 589, 591 n. 22.
Then, in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124
(1956), the Court held that a warranty of workmanlike service existed between steve-
dore-employers and shipowners. Through this doctrine, the shipowner could be fully
indemnified for his liability to the longshoremen in cases where the longshoreman or
another employee of the stevedore was negligent. It was possible for a stevedore-
employer to be ninety-nine percent liable for injuries to a longshoreman, himself one
percent at fault, even if the shipowner was ninety-nine percent at fault. If the long-
shoreman was at all negligent, the warranty of workmanlike service had not been met
and the shipowner was entitled to indemnification for the full ninety-nine percent lia-
bility recovered from him by the longshoreman under the seaworthiness doctrine. In
essence, the stevedore's statutorily limited liability provided for by the Act was circum-
vented by Sieracki and Ryan. See generally G. GILMORE AND C. BLACK, supra, § 6-14,
6-53, 6-55; Cohen and Dougherty, supra at 591-92.
3. Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251 (amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970))
(codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C. (1976)). See supra note 2.
4. In effect, Congress overruled Sieracki - thereby eliminating the shipowner's
liability to the longshoreman for unseaworthiness - and Ryan - thereby eliminating
the stevedore's liability to the shipowner for unworkmanlike service resulting in injury
to the longshoreman. S. Rep. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (19721, reprinted in 119721
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4701. See also G. GILMORE AND C. BLACK, supra note 2, at
§§ 6-la, 6-46, 6-50. In addition, compensation benefits were increased, the Act's geo-
graphic coverage was expanded, and a new means of adjudicating compensation cases
was instituted. Robertson, Jurisdiction, Shipowner Negligence, and Stevedore Immuni-
ties Under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's Act, 28 MERCER L. REV. 515,
516 (1977).
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the combined negligence of shipowners, stevedore and injured longshoreman,
the shipowner's liability is not restricted to that proportion of total damages
equal to his proportion of fault. Rather, the shipowner is liable for all
damages not due to the longshoreman's negligence.
This suit was initiated by Stanley Edmonds, a longshoreman employed
by Nacirema Operating Company,5 for injuries sustained in 1974 while
unloading rolling cargo containers from the S.S. Atlantic Cognac, a vessel
owned by the defendant, Compagnie Generale Transatlantique. At the time
the action was brought, Edmonds was receiving benefits for his injury from
his employer under the Act.' Since the Act preserved the longshoreman's
maritime negligence action against the shipowner, Edmonds sought addi-
tional relief from the defendant.'
5. The stevedore-employer, Nacirema Operating Co., is not a party to this case.
6. 443 U.S. at 258.
7. Id. at 263 n. 12; S. Rep. No. 1125, supra note 4, at 9-10. The Senate Report
explained the situation and the changes being made in the following manner:
One of the most controversial and difficult issues which the committee has been
required to resolve in connection with this bill concerns the liability of vessels, as
third parties, to pay damages to longshoremen who are injured while engaged in
stevedoring operations. The Committee rejected the proposal, originally advanced
by the industry, that vessels should be treated as joint employers of longshoremen
or other persons covered under this Act working on board such vessels. This would
result in restricting the vessel's liability in all cases to the compensation and
other benefits payable under the Act. The Committee believes that where a long-
shoreman or other worker covered under this Act is injured through the fault of
the vessel, the vessel should be liable for damages as a third party, just as land-
based third parties in non-maritime pursuits are liable for damages when,
through their fault, a worker is injured.
The Committee also rejected the thesis that a vessel should be liable without
regard to its fault for injuries sustained by employees covered under this Act
while working on board the vessel.
[The report then traces the judicial imposition of absolute liability in Sieracki
and the creation of the shipowner's right of indemnification in Ryan resulting in
the circumvention of the stevedore-employer's limited liability under the Act].
Accordingly, the Committee has concluded that, given the improvement in
compensation benefits which this bill would provide, it would be fairer to all con-
cerned and fully consistent with the objective of protecting the health and safety
of employees who work on board vessels for the liability of vessels as third parties
to be predicated on negligence, rather than the no-fault concept of seaworthiness.
This would place vessels in the same position, insofar as third party liability is
concerned, as land-based third parties in non-maritime pursuits.
Persons to whom compensation is payable under the Act retain the right to
recover damages for negligence against the vessel, but under these amendments
they cannot bring a damage action under the judicially-enacted doctrine of sea-
worthiness. Thus a vessel shall not be liable in damages for acts or omissions of
stevedores or employees of stevedores subject to this Act, (citations omitted); for
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In December 1975, a jury trial resulted in a general verdict for Edmonds
in the amount of $100,000.' A special verdict found that Edmonds was ten
percent negligent, defendant was twenty percent negligent, and the steve-
dore-employer was seventy percent negligent.' Accordingly, the District
Court entered. judgment against the shipowner for $90,000; the award was
reduced by that proportion of negligence contributed by the longshoreman.
On the shipowner's appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that where the
longshoreman's injury was due to the combined negligence of shipowner,
stevedore and longshoreman, the shipowner could be required to pay only
that proportion of the total damages equal to his proportion of fault.10 The
Fourth Circuit based its decision on its understanding of the wording of the
1972 amendment of § 905(b) of the Act which reads:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the
negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to
recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such
vessel as a third party in accordance with the provisions of Section 933
of this title and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such
damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the
contrary shall be void. If such person was employed by the vessel to
provide stevedoring services, no such action shall be permitted if the
injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing
stevedoring services to the vessel." (emphasis added).
the manner of method in which stevedores or employees of stevedores subject to
this Act perform their work, (citations omitted); for gear or equipment of steve-
dores or employees of stevedores subject to this Act whether used aboard ship, or
ashore, (citations omitted); or for other categories of unseaworthiness which have
been judicially established. This listing of cases is not intended to reflect a judg-
ment as to whether recovery on a particular actual setting could be predicated on
a vessel's negligence ...
Since the vessel's liability is to be based on its own negligence, and the vessel
will no longer be liable under the seaworthiness doctrine for injuries which are
really the fault of the stevedore, there is no longer any necessity for permitting
the vessel to recover the damages for which it is liable to the injured worker from
the stevedore or other employer of the worker.
The House submitted a virtually identical report which is reprinted in [19721 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 4698.
8. The first jury trial resulted in a verdict for Edmonds for $97,000. The district
court judge, however, granted the defendant's motion for a new trial, based on errors
committed by the court in charging the jury. 558 F.2d 186, 189 (4th Cir. 1976).
9. 443 U.S. at 258.
10. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 577 F.2d 1153, 1154 (4th
Cir. 1978).
11. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b)(1976); see G. GILMORE AND C. BLACK, supra note 2, at § 6-
343
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The Fourth Circuit considered the above two italicized sentences to be in
conflict.2
Interpreting the first sentence to mean that any negligence on the part of
the shipowner would warrant recovery while any negligence on the part of
the stevedore would defeat recovery, the Fourth Circuit found the two
sentences irreconcilable. Therefore, to harmonize the two, the Court deter-
mined that it was necessary to read the two sentences in apportioned terms. 3
Other courts of appeals have reached the opposite conclusion.'"
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
Fourth Circuit decision. 5 Writing the opinion for the Supreme Court, Mr.
Justice White initially discussed the 1972 amendment of § 905(b) as
understood by the Fourth Circuit.'6 Stating that "the conflict seen by the
Court of Appeals is largely one of its own creation," the Court explained the
two sentences of § 905(b). 7 The first sentence refers to longshoremen,
employed by a stevedoring concern, injured by the negligence of the
shipowner. Such a longshoreman receives statutory benefits from the
stevedore-employer under the Act and may sue the shipowner as a third
party. In addition, the shipowner is prevented from recouping from the
stevedore any of the damages for which he is liable to the injured
longshoreman.18
The second sentence refers to injured longshoremen employed directly by
shipowners to provide stevedoring services. If such a longshoreman's injury is
caused by the negligence of others providing stevedoring services, there are
12. 577 F.2d at 1155.
13. Id.
14. Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 725 (2d Cir. 1978) (manufacturer of
defective crane denied indemnification by concurrently negligent stevedore); Samuels
v. Empressa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884, 887-99 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 3106 (1979) (vessel owner denied indemnification by stevedore-
employer); Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 529 F.2d 669, 671-73 (9th
Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 528
F.2d 675, 679-80 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976), (shipowner denied
defense of contributory negligence of stevedore-employer and stevedore-employer's
statutory lien unaffected by same).
15. 443 U.S. at 273.
16. Id. at 263. Joining in the opinion were Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
Black, Rehnquist and Brennan.
17. Id.; see also S. Rep. No. 1125, supra note 4, at 9-11, (19721 U.S. CODE CONG &
AD. NEWS, 4701, 4719.
18. 443 U.S. at 264. In effect, "the first sentence overrules Ryan," preventing the
shipowner from seeking retribution from the stevedore for damages that the longshore-
man may recover. See supra note 2. See also S. Rep. No. 1125, supra note 4, at 9-11,
11972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4703-4.
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limitations on his bringing suit against the shipowner. "The second sentence
means no more than that all longshoremen are to be treated the same."'9
Thus, a longshoreman hired directly by the shipowner is treated the same as
a longshoreman employed by a stevedore hired by a shipowner. Similarly,
stevedores are treated the same whether they are independent stevedores, or
shipowners providing their own stevedoring services.
Having reconciled the two sentences of § 905(b), the Court then considered
whether the section indicated Congressional modification of the rule that a
longshoreman injured by the concurrent negligence of the stevedore and the
shipowner can recover in full from the shipowner. Recognizing that the
section is awkwardly worded, the Court emphasized that the reports
preceding the enactment of the amendments reiterated the retention of the
longshoreman's negligence action against the shipowner.2 In effect, the
shipowner is to be treated like a land-based third party tortfeasor 2 '
Therefore, the longshoreman, "to whom compensation is payable under the
Act [retains] the right to recover damages for negligence against the
vessel."22 Under the traditional admiralty rule, such recovery is for the full
amount of damages less that proportion attributed to the longshoreman's
negligence.23
Finally, the Court rejected the Fourth Circuit determination that the
proportionate-fault rule was intended by Congress. Such a rule would reduce
the shipowner's liability to the court's assessment of his negligence.
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit rule would also result in additional burdens
on the longshoreman. One such burden would be the inability of the
longshoreman to recover full damages; this could occur in three ways. First,
the longshoreman will not be fully compensated when the stevedore's
negligence exceeds the proportion of damages under the Act if the
shipowner's liability is limited by the proportionate-fault rule; the stevedore's
liability is already limited by statute. Second, there also exists a judicially-
created lien in favor of the stevedore-employer when the longshoreman
brings the suit himself.25 This lien serves to decrease the longshoreman's
19. 443 U.S. at 266; see also S. Rep. No. 1125, supra note 4, at 9-11, [19721 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4705.
20. 443 U.S. at 266-67; see also S. Rep. No. 1125, supra note 4, at 9-11, [1972]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4703-4.
21. 443 U.S. 260 n. 8, 271 n. 30; see also S. Rep. No. 1125, supra note 4, at 10-11,
(19721 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4703.
22. S. Rep. No. 1125, supra note 4, at 11, [19721 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4703.
23. 443 U.S. at 259; see supra note 2 G. GILMORE AND C. BLACK, supra note 2, at
§ 6-27a.
24. 443 U.S. at 269.
25. Id.
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recovery by allowing the stevedore to recoup the compensation paid the
longshoreman from the latter's recovery in his suit against the shipowner. If
the shipowner's liability is limited to his proportionate fault, the possibility
exists that the longshoreman will be left with nothing after the stevedore
recoups the compensation he has paid.26 Third, § 933(b) allows assignment to
the stevedore-employer of the longshoreman's rights against the third party
shipowner unless he sues within six months of the injury. If such a suit is
brought by the stevedore-employer, he may retain from any recovery the
expenses of bringing the suit, the medical services and compensation paid the
longshoreman, the present value of the benefits to be paid, and one-fifth of
the remainder of the recovery." Under a proportionate-fault rule, when the
stevedore brings the suit pursuant to § 933(c) of the Act, the longshoreman
will get "little, if any, of the diminished recovery obtained by his employer."
' '
The Court concluded that while inequity exists in the present statutory
scheme, nothing indicates that Congress intended a shift of the inequity from
the shipowner to the longshoreman which would occur with a proportionate
fault rule.
The Court rejected the suggestion that it alter the division of liability
despite the lack of Congressional intent. Although it had supported a division
of damages between parties based on their comparative fault in the past, 9 the
Court had done so in a particular situation, distinguishable from this case. 0
Since Edmonds involved a melange of judge-made and statutory law, to alter
the former without regard to the latter could have a drastic effect on both.
The Court therefore explained that "[olnce Congress has relied upon
conditions that the courts have created, we are not as free as we would
otherwise be to change them. A change in the conditions would effectively
alter the statute by causing it to reach different results than Congress
envisioned."3'
26. In the past, this lien has been for the benefits paid by the stevedore, up to the
amount of the longshoreman's recovery from the shipowner. Thus, if the shipowner's
share of fault is less than the benefits paid by the stevedore under the Act, the prop-
ortionate fault rule would deny the longshoreman any recovery from the shipowner.
27. 33 U.S.C. § 933 (c) (1976); 443 U.S. at 270.
28. Id. In Edmonds, because of the division of fault, such a result would not dimin-
ish the longshoreman's recovery any more than if he himself had sued; see supra note
26.
29. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975) (a collision case in
which both joint tortfeasors were parties). Because the stevedore is not a party in
Edmonds, its fault cannot be comparatively allocated. See also Cohen and Dougherty,
supra note 2, at 605-07.
30. 443 U.S. at 271 n. 30.
31. Id. at 273.
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The dissent, written by Mr. Justice Blackmun, attacks the Court's
opinion for its lack of fairness." Since the shipowner is held ninety percent
liable for Edmonds' damages, and the stevedore recoups the statutory benefits
therefrom, the defendant-shipowner is effectively held vicariously liable for
the stevedore-employer's negligence.Y The dissent argued that this result is
neither compelled by the language nor the legislative history of § 905(b) of
the Act and that it reduces the incentives for the stevedore to provide a safe
work place for his longshoremen-employees. Justice Blackmun saw the Court
as offering two justifications for this result: a) "[PIrinciples of comparative
negligence did not apply under the traditional law of admiralty, and Congress
intended to preclude judicial modification of that law when it enacted the
1972 Amendments to the (Act]"; and b) "[A] rule of comparative negligence
would be unfair to injured longshoremen. '
Blackmun disagreed with two of the Court's statements: the first, that
admiralty law in 1972 did not permit reduction of a shipowner's liability by
the stevedore-employer's comparative negligence; and the second, that
Congress did not impose a comparative fault rule with the 1972 amendment
of § 905(b) to the Act." As to the former, Justice Blackmun pointed out that
the cases cited by the Court deal with the issue of the right of contribution
among joint tortfeasors, not with the issue of proportionate liability for
comparative negligence. As to the latter, he argued that the "tension"
between the two sentences of § 905(b) is more plausibly harmonized if one
understands Congress to imply comparative negligence,' Furthermore,
Justice Blackmun rejected the Court's assertion that Congress intended to
prohibit the Court from fashioning a rule of comparative negligence.
Justice Blackmun further argued that the Judiciary has traditionally
played a large role in the formulation of admiralty law and should continue
to do so. As recently as 1975, the Court stated that "the Judiciary has
traditionally taken the lead in formulating flexible and fair remedies in the
law maritime, and 'Congress has largely left to this Court the responsibility
for fashioning the controlling rules of admiralty law.'-"7 In addition, nothing
indicated an intention on the part of Congress to discontinue this role of the
Judiciary. Rather, Congress intended to overrule Sea Shipping Co. u.
32. Id. at 274. Mr. Justice Blackmun's dissent was joined by Justices Marshall and
Stevens.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 275.
36. Id. at 275-76.
37. Id. at 276, quoting United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409
(1975).
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Sieracki and Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantic Steamship Corp.3
through the enactment of the § 905(b) amendment in 1972.40 The legislative
history demonstrates that Congress specifically reaffirmed the Court's
traditional role in resolving' " 'legal questions which may arise in actions
brought under this provision.' "" In conclusion, Blackmun stated that "[n]o
statutory or judicial precept precludes a change in the rule [that the
shipowner is fully liable for the concurrent negligence of the stevedore], and
indeed a proportional fault rule would simply bring recovery [as between the
stevedore and shipowner] into line with the rule of admiralty law long since
established [as between the longshoreman and the shipowner]"."2
Justice Blackmun next examined the injustice to the longshoreman
resulting from the application of a proportionate-fault rule. He perceived that
the longshoreman's total award would not be affected by such a rule; rather,
the division of the award between the stevedore and shipowner would be
affected. 3 The reduction of the longshoreman's total potential award is not
unfair because such a result is consistent with the policies of the statute, as
made clear by the differing purposes of the statutory compensation scheme
and the third party action for negligence." The statutory scheme is based on a
compromise whereby the longshoreman accepts less than full damages in
exchange for a guarantee, regardless of his and the stevedore-employer's fault
in causing the injury. It is just and reasonable that a stevedore who is 100%
negligent is limited in his liability to sixty-seven percent of the damages by
the Act. 5 The third party action for negligence, on the other hand, involves
an element of risk: while the longshoreman may get an award for full
damages, he risks getting nothing in the event that the shipowner is found
not to be negligent. Thus, a shipowner found 100% negligent is considered
justly liable for 100% of the damages., The difficulty arises from the interface
of the compensation scheme with the tort scheme, as in Edmonds .4 To award
38. 328 U.S. 85 (1946). See supra note 2.
39. 350 U.S. 124 (1956). See supra note 2.
40. 443 U.S. at 277.
41. Id., quoting from S. Rep. No. 1125, supra note 4, at 12.
42. 443 U.S. at 278.
43. Id. Justice Blackmun points out, for example, that such a rule applied to
Edmonds would result in his recovering twenty percent from the shipowner and eighty
percent from the stevedore's statutory benefits, rather than the ninety percent-ten per-
cent division required by the majority's decision.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 280.
47. Id.
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the longshoreman ninety percent damages when the shipowner is only
twenty percent negligent is characterized by Justice Blackmun as a windfall
to the longshoreman.41 In effect, the longshoreman has received the guaran-
teed statutory benefits from the stevedore and a
risk-free chance to obtain full damages if the shipowner is found
negligent in even the slightest degree. A more even-handed equity...
would be for the longshoreman to recover damages for that portion of the
injury for which the shipowner's negligence is responsible and to recover
the balance in statutory compensation, representing that portion of the
injury for which the longshoreman is guaranteed an award regardless of
fault .
9
Although Justice Blackmun recognized that the statute is open to two
interpretations, he stressed that the Court's duty "is to adopt the interpreta-
tion most consonant with reason, equity, and the underlying purposes
Congress sought to achieve. ' If that interpretation is not what Congress
intended, Congress can legislate to correct the situation. To express doubts
about the equity of the result and leave any change to Congress, may bring
no change, thus leaving the law with an unjust and unfair result.'
At the policy level, there is justification for the Court's holding in
Edmonds. The purpose of the Act is to provide longshoremen a means of
recovering for their work-related injuries. Edmonds adheres to this purpose
by safeguarding the longshoreman's right to recover for injuries caused in
part by shipowner negligence.
The Court's holding also works, however, against the purpose of the Act
as a safeguard for longshoremen by reducing stevedore-employer's incentives
to provide a safe working environment for their longshoremen-employees.
52
By not holding the stevedore liable for his proportion of the fault and, in fact,
making the shipowner wholly liable for the longshoreman's injuries, the
stevedore has nothing to gain by providing a safe work place and nothing to
lose by disregarding the hazards of the work place.
Furthermore, the Edmonds decision puts an undue burden on the
shipowner, much like that which resulted from the Court's holding in
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 277.
349
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Sieracki,Ds which was subsequently undermined by Ryan and overruled by the
1972 amendments to the Act.'
Given these considerations, the real questions faced by the Court were to
defer the issue to Congress; and if not how to determine the recovery.
Given these considerations, the real questions faced by the Court were:
whether to defer the issue to Congress; and if not, how to determine the
recovery.'
As to the first question, admiralty law has traditionally been, in large
part, court-made law. Beginning in 1927 with the original enactment of the
Act, however, Congress has periodically made an effort to cure deficiencies in
the law regarding longshoremen's recoveries for injuries. Since that time, the
efforts of the Court and Congress have resulted in progress combined with
confusion. This is again exemplified by the result brought about by the
Congress' 1972 Amendments to the Act and the Court's application and
interpretation thereof in Edmonds. It is too simplistic to leave the solution to
Congress and have the Court discontinue its traditional role in maritime
law-making. The solution, rather, is for everyone concerned to recognize more
fully the complications of the employee-employer-third party maritime suit
and to deal with them realisticallyM Only by recognizing this complexity and
accepting the conflicting interests of each party can an acceptable overall
scheme balancing equities and liabilities be developed to deal with the
recovery of longshoremen from their employers and third party tortfeasors for
work- related injuries.
Vivian C. Kresslein
53. See supra note 2.
54. See supra note 4.
55. See generally Cohen and Dougherty, supra note 2; Coleman, The 1972 Amend-
ments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act; Life Expectancy of Equitable
Credit, 12 THE FORUM 683 (1977); Coleman and Daly, Equitable Credit: Apportionment
of Damages According to Fault in Tripartite Litigation Under the 1972 Amendments to
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, 35 MD. L. REV. 351 (1976).
56. See Cohen and Dougherty, supra note 2, at 605-07.
